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P Jeffrey BrantinghamAbstract
More than 63,000 cars were reported stolen in Los Angeles in 2003–04. However, the distribution of thefts across
car types is very uneven. Some cars types such as the Honda Civic were stolen at much higher frequencies than
the majority of car types. Charnov’s classic prey selection model suggests that such uneven targeting should be
related to variations in the environmental abundance, expected payoffs, and handling costs associated with
different car types. Street-based surveys in Los Angeles suggest that differences in abundance explain the majority
of thefts. Cars stolen despite being rare may reflect offender preference based on differential payoffs, probably in
some non-monetary currency such as prestige or excitement. Differential handling costs play a more ambiguous
role in target selection, but may underlie thieves’ decisions to ignore some cars common in the environment. The
unspecialized nature of car theft in Los Angeles suggests that the behavioral and cognitive capacities needed to be
a successful car thief are generic. The evolved capacity to solve foraging problems in boundedly-rational ways,
mixed with small amounts of trial-and-error and/or social learning, are sufficient to produce experts from
inexperienced thieves.
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Social learningBackground
The rational choice theory of crime holds that offenders
engage in crime because they stand to receive significant
short-term benefits with little attendant risk and small
associated costs (Cornish and Clarke 1986, 1987). Pre-
sented with a suitable target or victim, unguarded by an
effective security measure, the reasoning offender gene-
rally capitalizes on that opportunity (Felson and Clarke
1998; Freeman 1996). Beyond implying a common-sense
relationship between benefits and costs, however, ra-
tional choice theory does not immediately identify what
makes any given victim or target suitable. A conceptual
framework introduced by Clarke (1999) suggests that
property targets are suitable when they are concealable,
removable, available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable,
capturing several of the dimensions of costs and benefits
that are important in offender decision making. While
useful, the so-called CRAVED approach also leaves much
unspecified about the relative importance of relationships
among the different dimensions of target suitability.Correspondence: branting@ucla.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pHere I turn to theory arising outside of criminology to
provide a formal framework in which understand the re-
lationships between target characteristics and offender
target selection. Specifically, I use Charnov’s (1976) prey
selection model to evaluate offender choice to steal dif-
ferent car types. The prey selection model postulates
that a forager will ignore a particular prey type upon en-
counter if the expected return from a future prey en-
counter is greater. Preference in Charnov’s model is
defined in terms of the relative abundance of different
prey types and their respective handling costs and pay-
offs upon consumption. Intuitively, prey that are easy to
handle or have high payoffs may be preferred but rarely
taken, if they are rarely encountered. Prey that are hard
to handle or have low payoffs may still be taken, if more
profitable prey are rarely encountered. Here the predic-
tions of Charnov’s prey selection model are rejected
based on findings that unique car types are stolen almost
exclusively in response to their environmental availabi-
lity. Only occasionally are cars targeted because they
have higher perceived payoffs. Overall, Los Angeles car
thieves operate primarily as unspecialized foragers.an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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Foraging theory is the branch of ecology that seeks to
understand how animal behavior facilitates the encoun-
ter, acquisition and processing of resources necessary to
survival (Stephens and Krebs 1986). The foraging chal-
lenges facing an animal are substantial. Essential re-
sources are rarely located in the same location as the
animal needing them, necessitating behaviors that either
carry the animal to the resources, or position the animal
to intercept resources that move. Many resource types
possess defenses that aim to thwart acquisition, even
after a forager has encountered them. Animals therefore
need behavioral strategies designed discriminate among
resource types and defeat their defenses once they have
decided to acquire them. Finally, even after a resource as
been encountered and acquired, it may contain a mix-
ture of useable and unusable constituents. Behaviors
may play a key role in sorting and separating these con-
stituents. Only after jumping these foraging hurdles may
an animal benefit from the resource. Recognize, how-
ever, that the behaviors deployed to facilitate encounter,
acquisition and processing of a resources are not cost
free. Optimal foraging theory therefore posits that evolu-
tion and/or learning has shaped animal behavior to
maximize the average or long-term return rate from es-
sential resources, net the costs of encounter, acquisition
and processing. Here I cast car theft as a foraging prob-
lem and test the proposition that the specific car types
stolen represent behaviors consistent with optimal for-
aging theory.
Three conditions must be met to consider car theft as
an optimal foraging problem (see also Bernasco 2009;
Felson 2006; Johnson et al. 2009). First, car theft should
satisfy a need that is perceived by the offender to be
essential. Car thieves report a range of motivations for
stealing cars including financial motives such as theft-
for-export or an immediate need for cash, mundane or
routine motives such as transportation, and recreational
motives such as a search for excitement, prestige or sta-
tus (Copes 2003; Dhami 2008; Kellett and Gross 2006;
Lantsman 2013; Light et al. 1993). With the exception of
theft-for-transport, car theft is not remarkable in mo-
tivation compared with other crimes (Wright et al. 2006;
Wright and Decker 1994). However, car theft may be a
comparably low risk alternative to satisfy these needs
(Copes and Tewksbury 2011). Between 2003 and 2006,
~12.9% of reported car thefts in the US were cleared by
arrests, while robberies over the same period were
cleared at a rate twice as high ~25.8% (Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2003–2006). The vast majority of car thefts
therefore entail no negative consequences, at least over
the short term (Freeman 1999). The benefits may there-
fore be substantial. Payoffs to car theft might be calcu-
lated in a cash currency, if cars and/or their parts arebeing fenced (Clarke 1999; Tremblay et al. 2001). Payoffs
might also be calculated in non-cash commodities such
as barter value in drugs (Stevenson and Forsythe 1998)
or prestige and excitement—an essential resource for joy
riding teenagers (Copes 2003; Jacobs et al. 2003; Kellett
and Gross 2006).
Second, car thieves must also have behavioral alter-
natives to deploy during foraging and these alternatives
must result in different payoff outcomes. Ethnographic
evidence indicates that car theft involves choices be-
tween alternative search strategies, tools and tech-
niques for gaining entry and ‘hot wiring’ targeted
vehicles, and strategies for escape and disposal of
stolen vehicles (Copes and Cherbonneau 2006; Copes
and Tewksbury 2011; Farrell et al. 2011; Langworthy
and Lebeau 1992; Lantsman 2013; Light et al. 1993; Lu
2003). Whether these different behavioral alternatives
lead to real differences in payoffs is an open question.
The observation that different car types are stolen to
satisfy different needs may imply differential payoffs
(Clarke 1999). However, the extent to which alternative
behavioral strategies drive these payoffs, as required by
optimal foraging theory, is unknown.
Finally, there must be a mechanism by which car
thieves select among the alternative behaviors, yielding
near-optimal strategies for locating, stealing and dis-
posing of cars. Simple trial-and-error and/or social
learning in the context of co-offending appear to play
this role (Akers 2008; Reiss and Farrington 1991). Ju-
venile car thieves often start as passengers, observing
the actions of their more experienced friends (Light
et al. 1993). Such learning mechanisms seem capable
quickly producing effective cognitive scripts that car
thieves can adhere to during commission of a crime
(Tremblay et al. 2001).The prey selection model
The foraging problem confronted by car thieves is
similar in many ways to prey selection, a classical
problem in behavioral ecology studied by Charnov
(1976) and others (see Krebs et al. 1977; Stephens
and Krebs 1986). Given sequential encounters with
prey types, each having different expected returns
and handling costs, which types should be pursued
and captured? Let ei, hi and λi be the expected payoff,
handling cost and local density of a prey of type i.
Prey types i = 1, 2, … N are ranked in descending
order of the ratio of payoff to handling cost ei/hi. The
prey classification algorithm says that prey types i =
1, 2, … j should be pursued and captured upon en-
counter, but prey type j + 1 should be ignored if its
payoff to handling cost ratio is below the mean for
all higher ranked prey:












In other words, if the expected return from future prey
encounters is higher than would be gained by taking the
current target, then it is better to wait.
The prey choice model makes two distinctive pre-
dictions. First, prey types are either always taken upon
encounter, or always ignored. This is the so-called
“zero–one” rule in reference to the analytical result that
an attack on prey type i will occur with probability
qi = 0, or qi = 1, and nothing in between (Stephens and
Krebs 1986). Second, whether or not a prey type is taken
is dependent only on the encounter rate with higher-
ranked prey, not its own encounter rate. Note that the
term λi appears only on the left-hand side in Equation
(1). The implication is that only changes in the encoun-
ter rate with higher ranked prey items will impact the
decision to attack a lower ranked prey item once it has
been encountered. Thus, if a higher ranked prey type be-
comes very scarce, a lower ranked prey type may be
added to the diet. However, if a lower ranked prey type
suddenly becomes very common, it will not necessarily
be added to the diet without a concomitant change in
the rate of encounter with higher ranked types. Empi-
rical evidence from both animal (Hughes and Dunkin
1984; Prugh 2005; but see Pyke 1984) and human for-
agers (Hames and Vickers 1982; Smith 1991) suggests
that the prey classification algorithm provides insights
into prey selection behavior across a diverse range of
taxa and foraging contexts.
Car theft may be considered a special case of prey se-
lection if car types vary in expected payoffs, handling
costs and/or local abundance and offenders are attentive
to these differences. As discussed in the Methods sec-
tion, the available data on payoffs and handling times do
not allow for a fine-grained test of either the zero–one
rule, or the hypothesis that changes in the encounter
rate with higher-ranked car types impact the inclusion of
lower ranked car types in an offender’s ‘diet’. A strict
reading of the prey choice model also suggests that car
theft may not perfectly conform to all of its assumptions
(see for comparison Smith 1991). The prey choice model
assumes that: (1) foragers are long-term rate maxi-
mizers, meaning that average results of stealing cars over
long time periods, rather than short-term gains, are opti-
mized by different foraging strategies; (2) searching for
and handling of targeted vehicles are mutually exclusive;
(3) encounters with vehicles follow a Poisson process,
meaning that two cars cannot be encountered simultan-
eously and each encounter is statistically independent ofall others; (4) the payoff to stealing cars ei, the handling
costs hi, and encounter rates λi are environmentally fixed
in time and space; and (5) that the foraging car thief has
perfect information about ei, hi and λi.
Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5 may be reasonable for car
theft. The notion that criminal behavioral strategies
might be shaped by learning to produce long-term aver-
age rate maximization (Assumption 1) seems far fetched
at first (but see Tremblay and Morselli 2000). Criminal
offenders tend to be present-oriented (Gottfredson and
Hirschi 1990; Nagin and Paternoster 1994) and therefore
appear little concerned with the long-term costs and
benefits of crime (Wilson and Abrahamse 1992). How-
ever, the question at hand is not whether crime pays
relative to non-crime alternatives, but rather whether
stealing one car type is more profitable in the long run
than stealing an alternative car type. It is conceivable
that offenders adopt strategies that maximize the long-
term or average payoffs from car theft by making dis-
criminating choices about which cars to steal.
It is also reasonable to suppose that simultaneous
search for cars to steal and the physical act stealing a car
are mutually exclusive activities (Assumption 2). This is
made more complicated by co-offending, which is quite
common for younger car thieves (Light et al. 1993), if
some in an offending party search nearby targets while
others are breaking into a given car.
It is unknown whether encounters with cars to steal
follow a Poisson process (Assumption 3). Ultimately, this
is an empirical question for which data need to be
collected. Conceptually, however, a motivated car thief
walking down a linear street segment encounters cars
sequentially and independently. Whether such condi-
tions hold in a parking lot may depend on situational
factors such as the layout of and available observation
points in the lot. The prey choice model is not obviated
under these circumstances (Stephens and Krebs 1986:
38–45), but additional costs associated with discrimina-
ting between simultaneously encountered car types must
be taken into account.
Perhaps the greatest challenge comes from strictly as-
suming that the key parameters of prey selection remain
fixed in time and space (Assumption 4) (Suresh and
Tewksbury 2013). At intermediate time scales (months
to years), the payoffs to stealing different car types cer-
tainly change with turnover in the composition of cars
on the street. Early and late model years may differ sig-
nificantly in both perceived or actual value as well as
handling costs, for example, following the introduction
of RFID keys for ignition systems (Farrell et al. 2011).
Similarly, there may be short-term (hourly-daily) fluctua-
tions in environmental abundance of cars parked in lo-
cations where they might be stolen. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to assume that car thieves have relatively
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handling costs associated with different cars, or learn them
very quickly when conditions change (Assumption 5)
(Akers 2008; Light et al. 1993).
Given the above limitations, I test a conservative null
hypothesis in place of the two detailed predictions made
by the prey selection model:
 H0. If every car yields the same payoff and all are
equally difficult to steal (i. e., ei/hi = ej/hj∀ i, j),
then differences in theft rates arise only from
differences in relative abundances of car types λi.
In other words, if all cars rank equally in the ratio of
payoffs to handling costs, then all cars are part of the
‘diet’ and should be taken immediately upon encounter.
Cars encountered more frequently will appear in the diet
more often and, in fact, will be stolen at a frequency
proportional to λi. One should therefore expect a strong
correlation between relative abundances and theft rates
if the null hypothesis is true. Failure to reject the null
hypothesis implies that car thieves are unspecialized for-
agers and take only what is presented to them by the en-
vironment. Rejection of the null hypothesis, for all or
even some car types, may constitute evidence that dif-
ferential payoffs and/or handling costs enter into car
thieves’ situational foraging decisions. Under these cir-
cumstances we can evaluate the role that payoffs and/or
handling costs may play in driving target choice.
Methods
Car types are defined as unique make-models or, where
necessary, make-model-years. For example, 1992 and
2002 Honda Civics may be different car types, from the
point of view of the offender, because they have different
perceived payoffs and may also differ in how easy they
are to break into and ‘hot wire’ (Farrell et al. 2011). An
initial database of car make-model-years was assembled
using a popular car shopping and research website,
www.edmonds.com. A student assistant was then trained
to quickly and accurately identify car types in pilot sur-
veys of a university campus parking structures.
Street-based surveys were conducted in three Los
Angeles zip codes (90034, 90045 and 90291) during two
excursions in October-December 2004 and October-
December 2005. The three survey locations had the
highest volume of car thefts in 2003 among zip codes on
the Los Angeles West Side. Surveys involved walking be-
tween one and three contiguous blocks, first up one side
and then down the other. Surveys on the exact same
block segments were conducted at two-hour intervals
between 6AM and 6PM. The most dramatic change in
density of cars parked on the street occurred between
6AM and 8AM. I therefore assume that the mix of cartypes seen at 6AM represents the overnight diversity.
Only vehicles in publically accessible street locations
were recorded. The observed relative frequency of each
car type i is used as a measure of encounter rate λi.
Expected value on the illegal market is used as a proxy
for the payoffs ei associated with stealing different car
types (Copes 2003; Matsueda et al. 1992). I do not as-
sume that all car thieves seek cash. Rather, illegal market
value is a generic currency that is expected to be posi-
tively correlated with non-monetary payoffs. For ex-
ample, a ‘hot car’ is not only more likely to demand
more money in an illegal market context, but it is also
expected to have a higher payoff in excitement and pres-
tige for the teenage car thief. Illegal market value is cal-
culated as ei = f ∑ ipivi, where pi is the proportion of cars
of a given make-model-year stolen, vi is the legal market
value of the car at the time of theft as determined from
the Kelley Blue Book (DeBacker 2003), and f is the frac-
tion of the legal market value realized on the illegal mar-
ket. I assume that f = 0.1, but choice of a different
constant does not impact the results.
I use break-in times as a proxy for overall handling
costs hi. The UK-based “What Car?” Security Supertest
(Secured by Design 2000, 2003) conducted attack testing
of new cars marketed in the UK. The tests evaluated the
ability of new vehicles to withstand attacks by trained
locksmiths using the non-destructive entry techniques
commonly deployed by car thieves. The tests included
123 unique make-models and measured the time, in
seconds, needed to gain entry to each vehicle. A car
was considered to pass the test if it was not possible
to gain entry within two minutes. Break-in time rep-
resents only one of the handling costs associated with
car theft. I assume, however, that the handling costs
at different critical points in the theft process are
positively correlated. For example, if a car is easy to
enter, it is also more likely to be easy to ‘hot wire’,
less likely to have a geo-location device installed and
be easier to chop.
Evaluation of the relationships between car theft, environ-
mental abundances, payoffs and handling costs is conducted
using non-parametric statistics that are robust to ordinal
scale data and non-normal distribution characteristics
(Conover 1998). Theft frequencies and environmental abun-
dances are compared using Kendall’s τ, a generalized correl-
ation coefficient that measures the similarity of ranked
order lists. Kendall’s τ b allows for rank order ties. Illegal
market values and break-in times among common and
rare cares are non-normally distributed. Medians
therefore provide the most robust measure of central
tendency and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney U
the most appropriate corresponding statistical test.
Differences in distribution shape are computed using
the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov D.
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Between 1 Jan 2003 and 31 December 2004, 63,528 vehi-
cles were reported stolen within the City of Los Angeles
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003–2006). In zip
codes 90034, 90045 and 90291, located on the West Side
of Los Angeles and representing ~3.5% of the land area
of the City, a total of 2,251 cars were stolen during the
same period, or ~3.5% of all thefts. These cars are di-
vided into 271 unique make-model types. The Honda
Civic and Accord, Toyota Camry and Corolla, and
Nissan Sentra together comprise ~25% of the total
thefts and 87 car types are represented by single thefts
(Figure 1A, Table 1).
To test whether the observed bias in thefts towards
some car types is driven by environmental abundance, I
conducted surveys of main artery and residential streets
(see Methods). A total of 1,825 cars were observed and
these were classified into 262 unique make-model types.
As with reported thefts, the cars available on the streets
are dominated by a few types (Figure 1B). Seventy se-
ven types identified in the survey are singletons. The dis-
tribution is qualitatively similar to rank species abun-
dance curves in ecology, which show environments








































































Figure 1 Rank order plots of make-model car types stolen and observ
(A) Cars stolen in zip codes 90034, 90045 and 90291 between Jan 1, 2003
(B) The rank order abundance of car types in the same zip codes, observed
car theft opportunities.the richness is accumulated through species with small
numbers of individuals Hubbell (2001). Here I focus on
the top 25 most commonly stolen cars. These car types
account for 53% of the total observed volume of stolen
cars (N = 1198) and the bulk of the variation in theft
frequency.
A comparison of theft and density rank order frequen-
cies shows a significant positive relationship (Kendall’s τ
b = 0.491, p < 0.001) (Figure 2). Thirteen of the top 25
most stolen cars are also in the top 25 for abundance
(Table 1). In general, the most common cars on the
street are also the most stolen. The positive relationship
between abundance and theft is particularly strong
among the top nine most stolen cars (Kendall’s τ b =
0.611, p = 0.022). Honda Civics are the most abundant
cars and the most frequently stolen. For the top nine
cars it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis that envir-
onmental abundance is driving the targeting of these ve-
hicles for theft.
Note, however, that approximately one half (N = 12)
of the top 25 most stolen cars are not in the top 25
for abundance. Several of these are significant outliers
(Table 1). For example, the Chrysler 300M is ranked





































N = 2,251 
vy Cavalier 
Porsche Carerra 
N = 1,825 
ed in street-based surveys in three Los Angeles zip codes.
and December 31, 2004 are numerically dominated by a few car types.
in street surveys conducted in 2004 and 2005, reveals the structure of
Table 1 The top 25 most stolen car types in 2003–2004 and their environmental densities in Los Angeles zip codes
90034, 90045 and 90291
Make-model Theft N Survey N Recovery N Theft p Survey p Recovery p Theft rank Survey rank
HONDA CIVIC 155 128 110 0.069 0.070 0.710 1 1
TOYOTA CAMRY 151 59 118 0.067 0.032 0.781 2 4
HONDA ACCORD 109 94 81 0.048 0.052 0.743 3 2
TOYOTA COROLLA 68 86 47 0.030 0.047 0.691 4 3
NISSAN SENTRA 60 33 45 0.027 0.018 0.750 5 9
ACURA INTEGRA 52 21 28 0.023 0.012 0.538 6 14
FORD MUSTANG 50 20 41 0.022 0.011 0.820 7 16
FORD EXPLORER 49 57 35 0.022 0.031 0.714 8 5
FORD TAURUS 46 28 36 0.020 0.015 0.783 9 11
PONTIAC GRAND AM/PRIX 43 4 38 0.019 0.002 0.884 10 110.5
NISSAN ALTIMA 35 42 27 0.016 0.023 0.771 11 7
CHEVY IMPALA 34 6 26 0.015 0.003 0.765 12.5 79.5
DODGE STRATUS 34 5 30 0.015 0.003 0.882 12.5 93.5
CHRYSLER 300M 33 1 31 0.015 0.001 0.939 14 224
CHEVY BLAZER 32 15 24 0.014 0.008 0.750 15 25
CHRYSLER PT CRUISER 31 8 26 0.014 0.004 0.839 16 58
DODGE CARAVAN 28 8 18 0.012 0.004 0.643 17.5 58
DODGE INTREPID 28 9 23 0.012 0.005 0.821 17.5 49.5
JEEP CHEROKEE 27 34 16 0.012 0.019 0.593 19 8
LINCOLN TOWN CAR 24 4 22 0.011 0.002 0.917 20 110.5
DODGE NEON 23 2 19 0.010 0.001 0.826 21.5 165.5
FORD FOCUS 23 7 20 0.010 0.004 0.870 21.5 68.5
CHRYSLER SEBRING 21 3 15 0.009 0.002 0.714 24 132.5
FORD EXPEDITION 21 12 13 0.009 0.007 0.619 24 32.5
JEEP GRAND CHEROKEE 21 20 14 0.009 0.011 0.667 24 16
Note: Theft and recovery proportions are calculated with respect to all 2,251 cars stolen. Survey proportions are calculated with respect to the 1,825 unique car
types identified in street-based surveys.
Environmental densities were measured in two survey periods October-December 2004 and October-December 2005.
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vey rank = 224). Similarly, the Pontiac Grand AM was
ranked 10, with 44 thefts, but was observed only four
times in the same surveys (survey rank = 110.5). It
may be that thieves targeted these rare cars based on
specialized evaluation of the expected payoffs, handling
costs, or both, made at the time of encounter.
Taking into account car make, model and year, I cal-
culated the expected illegal market value for each car
stolen in 2003 as 10% of the Kelley Blue Book value
at the time of theft (see Methods) (DeBacker 2003;
Stevenson and Forsythe 1998; Tremblay et al. 2001).
Illegal market value is used as broad proxy for both
monetary and non-monetary payoffs. Figure 3 shows
that the distribution of expected illegal market values
for the outliers is significantly different from that associ-
ated with environmentally common cars (Mann–Whitney
U = 8562, Wilcoxon = 73542, Z = −11.327, p < .001).Among the environmentally common cars, the median
expected illegal market value is $740 (min = $293, max =
$2,916). Among the environmentally rare cars, the median
is twice as large at $1,515 (min = $210, max $4,493).
These data suggest that the outliers within the sample of
stolen cars may be targeted because they offer a higher
expected payoff.
It is also possible that ease-of-theft is responsible
for the observed outliers (Farrell et al. 2011; Light
et al. 1993; Wiles and Costello 2000). The UK-based
“WhatCar?” Security Supertest (Secured by Design
2000, 2003), evaluated the ability of a range of new
vehicles to withstand attacks using non-destructive
entry techniques (see Methods). Break-in time is used
as a proxy for handling costs at all stages of the theft
process. The aggregated results from 2000 and 2003, ex-
cluding those cars that passed the test, show a weak, but
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Figure 2 A scatter plot of abundance rank order against theft rank order shows a strong positive relationship between car availability
and theft risk. Eleven car-types are stolen much more frequently than their environmental abundance would suggest. Line represents a
hypothetical 1:1 relationship between rank abundance and rank theft.
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(Figure 4A). The median break-in time for all vehicle types
successfully attacked was 29 seconds and the minimum
time was two seconds. Twenty three cars (~19%) have

























Figure 3 Frequency histograms of the estimated illegal market values
top nine most stolen cars (A), where density is expected to the major
environmental density is not implicated.Vehicle make-models are not equivalent between
the UK and US markets, despite similar names, and
comparable data are not available from US contexts. It is
not possible therefore to map break-in times from the
Security Supertests directly to car types stolen in the USket Value in $
5,0004,0003,000
show much lower expected payoffs may be attributed to the
determinant of theft, compared with the outliers (B), where
A B C
Figure 4 Break-in times for UK make-models measured by the “WhatCar?” Security Supertest in 2000 and 2003. (A) Scatter plot of
break-in time versus US market price implies only a weak relationship between payoffs and handling costs. Frequency histograms of the break-in
times for (B) GM-, Daimler-Chrysler- and Ford-group cars and (C) all other car types.
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costs may be gained by examining patterns within ma-
nufactures. Seven of the cars stolen in disproportion
to their environmental density were manufactured by
Daimler-Chrysler, three by Ford and two by GM (Table 1).
Of the 123 cars tested in the Security Supertests, 44 were
vehicles by these manufacturers. Eleven (25%) successfully
withstood attacks lasting two minutes, compared with 24
of the remaining 79 car types (44%). The data may sug-
gest that Daimler-Chrysler, GM and Ford vehicles are
more broadly susceptible to attack. However, a range of
break-in times characterize the vehicles that did not
pass the test (Table 2). Low and high-mid market cars
sold under the Chrysler brand (e.g., Neon, Grand Voyager)
have minimum break-in times of between four and six
seconds, while one low-market GM car sold under the
Vauxhall brand had a brake-in time of two seconds. Mid-
market GM cars, also sold under the Vauxhall brand, had
a mean break-in time of 81 seconds. The aggregate
results do not indicate that cars made by Daimler-
Chrysler, Ford or GM are disproportionately easier
for car thieves to handle. Indeed, cars marketed by
other manufacturers show a significant skew towards
shorter break-in times and, by implication, lower hand-
ling costs for thieves (Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z = 1.349,
p = 0.053) (Figure 4B,C).
Discussion and conclusion
It is difficult to reject the null hypothesis that environ-
mental abundance is the primary determinant of what
cars are targeted for theft. There is a particularly strong
relationship between abundance and theft rank for the
top-nine most stolen cars. In the CRAVED conceptualframework put forward by Clarke (1999), availability
would seem to outweigh other dimensions that might
influence theft choice. In the instances where cars are
targeted despite being rare, payoff differences may play
some role. Car recovery rates provide one measure of
the importance of non-monetary, or possibly limited
monetary payoffs to car theft (Clarke and Harris 1992).
There is little systematic difference in the rate of recov-
ery across car types (Table 1), suggesting that none of
the top 25 most stolen cars are disproportionately land-
ing in fully-body chop shops or being stolen for export.
The payoffs here seem to be primarily non-monetary.
Furthermore, among the outliers that are stolen despite
being rare, it appears that the newest model years are
targeted. For example, eight of 12 Chrysler 300s and
seven of 13 Chrysler Sebrings stolen during 2003 were
2004 model years, which became available only in the
last five months of the year. The implication is that these
cars, though rare, were targeted precisely because they
were perceived to be ‘hot rides’ (Wiles and Costello
2000). That some cars are more valuable or enjoyable
can override their low availability, but this occurs
infrequently.
It is less apparent that lower handling costs biased
thieves’ decisions to target environmentally rare cars, al-
though ethnographic work suggests that handling costs
are often a significant concern (Clarke 1999; Light et al.
1993; Wiles and Costello 2000). Recent research sug-
gests that the potential for encountering opposition from
car owners is a major concern (Copes and Tewksbury
2011), but it is uncertain how the probability of oppos-
ition might relate to car type. Direct handling costs may
have played a role in driving Los Angeles car thieves to
Table 2 Break-in times in seconds for Daimler-Chrysler, Ford and GM brands sold in the UK tested in the “WhatCar?”
Security Supertest in 2000 and 2003








Daimler-Chysler Chrysler Neon Low 1 4
Daimler-Chysler Mercedes A Class Mid 1 30
Daimler-Chysler Chrysler Grand Voyager High-mid 1 6
Daimler-Chysler Mercedes C, E Class High 2 70 7.07 65 75
Ford Fiesta, Focus Ghia Estate, Ka 3,
Mazda 626 Sport
Low 4 40.75 15.9 23 60
Ford Focus TDi Ghia, Ka, Streetka, Landrover
Freelander, Mazda MPV, Mazda Premacy
Mid 6 33.83 17.08 19 65
Ford Focus, Land Rover Discovery, Mazda 6 High-mid 3 43 13.45 28 54
Ford Mondeo, Jaguar XKR, Range Rover 4.0
HSE, Volvo XC90
High 4 69 21.76 40 93
GM Vauxall Agilla, Astra Low 2 12 13.44 2 21
GM Vauxall Corsa, Frontera, Meriva, Zafira Mid 4 81 40.04 21 108
GM Saab 93, Saab 95, Vauxall Astra High-mid 3 45.67 10.69 39 58
GM Cadillac Seville STS, Vauxall Vectra High 2 58 74.95 5 111
Total Daimler-Chrysler,
GM, Ford
33 46.88 30.68 2 111
Other Car types 55 32.22 29.36 2 115
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make-model types including the Volkswagen Jetta, Toyota
RAV4 and Nissan Xterra ranked within the top 25 for
abundance, but were rarely or never stolen (Table 3). An
average of 57% of the vehicles sold by the corresponding
manufactures in the UK passed the Security Supertests.
This is compared only 25% of Daimler-Chrysler, GM and
Ford cars representative of the environmentally rare
group. The implication is that these cars may be ignored
because they are more resistant to attack. Detailed attack
analyses of cars from the US market could help resolve
the exact role of handling costs in the differential targeting
of some cars.Table 3 Environmentally abundant cars of low theft rank in z
2000 and 2003 “WhatCar?” Security Supertest results for cars





Volkswagen Jetta 9 56 63 6 6
Toyota RAV4 5 19 91 18 8
Lexus ES 15 229 25 3
Nissan Xterra 2 16 164 21 5
Volvo S Class 17 229 19.5 3
Subaru Outback 2 15 164 25 3In spite of the narrow role that differential payoffs and
handling costs appear to play the choice of which cars to
steal, one must be careful to not fall prey to the eco-
logical fallacy. Ethnographic evidence points to a degree
of specialization among car thieves, with distinctions
among those engaged in opportunistic theft and those in
organized crime, and among younger and older of-
fenders. Such specializations are not directly visible in
aggregate car theft data. It is possible that the population
of Los Angeles car thieves consists of several different
types each with their preferred prey. The observed fre-
quency of stolen car types might therefore represent a
mixture of fixed, independent strategies, some rare andip codes 90034, 90045 and 90291 and the aggregated
from the corresponding manufacturers
assing p Models failing Mean (s) σ (s) Min (s) Max (s)
0.50 Lupo 1.4S, Polo Gti,
Golf 1.6SE
32 16.09 19 50
0.63 Yaris Verso, Corolla,
Avensis
46.33 15.50 31 46
0.67 IS 111




22.67 24.79 5 51
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fenders in general. The converse is also potentially true.
There is a danger of falling prey to an ethnographic fal-
lacy that confounds our ability to infer aggregate charac-
teristics from ethnographically rich data collected at an
individual scale. To wit, given interviews with tens of car
thieves about their offending preferences, can we reliably
infer the population characteristics of the many thou-
sands of individuals likely responsible for the 63,000 cars
stolen in Los Angeles in 2003-2004? There is no easy
way to resolve the ecological or ethnographic fallacy. I
suspect, however, that the unspecialized foragers respon-
ding primarily to environmental abundances greatly out-
number the specialists, making the latter practically
invisible in aggregate data.
The results described here are important for under-
standing the broader causes of criminal behavior and
may suggest novel approaches to crime prevention based
on formal ecological models (see also Bernasco 2009;
Brantingham et al. 2012; Felson 2006). The unspecialized
nature of car theft in Los Angeles implies that the be-
havioral and cognitive capacities needed to be a success-
ful thief are generic. Indeed, humans are well-equipped
to become effective foragers for criminal opportunities
given an evolved psychology to solve foraging problems
in boundedly-rational ways (Hutchinson et al. 2007),
combined with small amounts of individual trial-and-error
or social learning (Akers 2008; Boyd and Richerson 1985).
Indeed, the co-offending that characterizes the early ca-
reers (<20 years old) of most offenders, including car
thieves, is ideally suited to the transmission of the simple
skills sufficient to produce experts from inexperienced
thieves (Reiss and Farrington 1991). That auto theft in Los
Angeles is driven primarily by environmental structure
provides further evidence that the greatest gains in crime
prevention are to be had in altering the structure of crim-
inal opportunity (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981;
Farrell et al. 2011; Felson and Clarke 1998). How environ-
mental alterations impact situational foraging behaviors
and longer-term population trajectories are well-studied
within ecology (Henle et al. 2004; Kerr et al. 2007),
suggesting a way forward for formal crime ecology.Competing interests
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